Introduction
One
of the outcomes of the security challenge imposed by the Boko Haram insurgency
on Nigerian society has been the emergent preponderance of theories that
attempt to explain the motive of the Islamic group. Unlike the Niger Delta
militancy which preceded it, and which predicated its desire for a separate
state from Nigeria on decades of conspiratorial neglect by the Nigerian state
and multinational oil prospecting companies in the Niger Delta region, Boko
Haram has refrained from articulating and formally presenting its grievances,
apart from it’s declared desire for the strict interpretation of Islamic Law in
Nigeria. The confusion also grows out of the changing dynamics in the
operations of the sect. For instance, its terror campaign, which initially
targeted security formations and personnel, has expanded to include civilians
and non-government targets, and the Nigerian public generally.
The theories are divided into two broad
spectrums. One views the problem essentially as internal. The other blames
external forces. The former looks at socio-economic factors, as well as
deep-seated political, religious differences in the Nigerian society. It also
includes vengeance over the death of the sect’s leader, Ustaz Muhammed Yussuf.
The external forces argument has two planks: one characterizes the problem as
part of global Islamic jihad and focuses on the sect’s links with international
terror groups such as al Qaeda or its affiliates as al Shabaab or the al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM); the other views it as conspiratorial – a grand
strategy to achieve the predicted disintegration of Nigeria by 2015, (See
“Africa in 2020 Panel” Report). Within the conspiratorial thesis is the
sub-theme that Nigeria is being targeted by envious and troubled neighbors.
This aspect also links it to the now ‘unemployed’ war-hardened returnees from
the Libyan crisis and the assorted arms streaming out from that tumult.
How relevant these theories are to the
explanation of the current crisis is the question to which this paper addresses
itself. Is Nigeria merely convulsing from her many internal contradictions that
successive leadership has been unable to manage or resolve, or are external
forces actually at work to undermine Nigeria; if so, how and for what purpose?
While each of the competing perspectives indeed may offer some valid approximation
of the real cause(s) of Nigeria’s security challenge, the multiplicity has
tended to frustrate a clear understanding of the problem and articulation of
appropriate response to it. This paper set out to examine the entire gamut of
the theories with a view to clearing, rather than adding to the confusion. But
we can expect that, as the Boko Haram challenge persists; more theories will
continue to evolve.
Conflict
Conflict
theories are perspectives in sociology and social psychology that emphasize the
social, political, or material inequality of a social group, that critique the
broad socio-political system or that otherwise detract from structural
functionalism and ideological conservatism. Conflict theories draw attention to
power differentials, such as class conflict, and generally contrast
historically dominant ideologies. It is therefore a macro level analysis of
society. Karl Marx is the father of the social conflict theory, which is a
component of the four paradigms of sociology. Certain conflict theories set out
to highlight the ideological aspects inherent in traditional thought. While
many of these perspectives hold parallels, conflict theory does not refer to a
unified school of thought, and should not be confused with, for instance, peace
and conflict studies, or any other specific theory of social conflict.
Theoretical Considerations: Deeply
Divided Society, State Failure and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria.
Sociologically, most African
countries are multiethnic societies with populations that are sharply divided
along racial, cultural, linguistic, religious, and similar cleavages. Most are
composed of several and some, of many different traditional societies, each
with distinctive institutions to which members of other traditional societies
are not only detached but also disinclined, if not actually opposed (Jackson
and Rosberg, 1998:36). Politically, from the perspective of the European
colonial powers, a colony was not arbitrary. But from the perspective of
subject Africans, colonial government was essentially arbitrary. It was imposed
from outside and worked in accordance with alien and unfamiliar rules and
regulations in disregard, often in ignorance, of indigenous institutions.
Guenther Roth (1968) sees the divided plural society as an impediment to the
realization of modern, rational-legal institutions (cited in Jackson and
Rosberg, 1998:36). Therefore, the African state rather than being a public
force tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the service of private
interests by the dominant faction of the elite (Ake, 1996: 42).
Thus
according to Chabal and Daloz (1999), “its formal (rational-legal) structure
ill-manages to conceal the patrimonial and particularistic nature of power”
(cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012:96). In the words of former Senegalese
leader, Leopold Sedar Senghor, politics no longer is “a question of the art of
governing the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and
regulations. It is a question of politician politics – not even ideological
tendencies – to place oneself, one’s relatives, and one’s clients in the cursus
honorum that is the race for preferment – ‘the image of personal rule’”
(see Jackson and Rosberg, 1998:17).
The inherent complexities
in the states forged by European imperialism made less feasible the prospects
of the new states modelled after the Western types (Roth, cited in Jackson and
Rosberg, p. 36). Although the African states have come a long way down the road
of nation-building process, with many heterogeneous or multinational states
having to resort to varying ways of resolving their inter-group relations
(Elaigwu, 1997:58), many of the states still convulse from one shock after
another resulting from those sociological and political divergences; so much so
also because “the African state is hardly ever coextensive with a common
society” (Ekeh, 1989:5) and “the society in which it [the African state] exits
is typically segmented into small rival political communities, often with
strong localized identities, competing to capture and exploit state power or at
least prevent it from oppressing them” (Ake, 1999:42). According to Professor
Peter Ekeh, “The political history of Africa has become a tale of drift and
instability. Standing above and set aside and apart from society, the African
state has turned out to be arbitrary, because it operates outside societal
rules” (Ekeh, 1989:5).
The Human
Needs/Socio-Economic Perspective
The
socio-economic perspective of the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria, essentially
attempts to de-emphasise the interpretation of this being a particularly Muslim
or northern crisis (Kukah, 2012). The perspective which blames social
conditions for the violence is anchored on the human needs theory of social
conflicts. Its central thesis is that all humans have basic needs which they
seek to fulfil and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these
needs could lead to conflict (Rosati et al, 1990 cited in Faleti, p. 51). The
theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence, which
posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990: 266).
The Human Development Index Trend, for
instance, ranked Nigeria 156 out of 186 in 2011. The socio-economic factors
being adduced as the root causes of violence in Nigeria include unemployment,
especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living,
especially in the north. But perhaps its relevance in the interpretation of the
Boko Haram problem is that while its proponents admit of endemic poverty and
hopelessness generally in Nigeria, they note its severity in the north. Hence
for Professor Jean Herskovits of the State University of New York, to
whom “it was clear in 2009 when the insurgency began that the root cause of
violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty
and hopelessness,” the government must address socio-economic deprivation,
which is most severe in the north (Herskovits, 2012).
The
Political Feud Perspective
In
political terms, the Boko Haram phenomenon is perhaps more interesting because
of the specific historical context in which it is occurring. First, while other
Muslims may want to disassociate themselves from its activities, Boko Haram
remains an Islamic movement. It is also occurring in a multi-religious
political setting in which religion itself is a major factor in determining the
distribution of political power (Kukah, 1993: x). Second, its emergence was
preceded by intense political bickering between some, mainly Muslim political
actors in the north and their counterparts in the south in the period leading
to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and
southerner. In a political environment in which the power of incumbency is a
major factor in determining electoral success, the fact that the victor in the
contest superintended over the machinery of the state at the time of the
election is a critical variable in conveying a sense of fair play or otherwise
to the losing side. Importantly, Jonathan’s electoral victory came barely three
years after power returned to the north, from an eight-year sojourn in the
south, where the north grudgingly ceded it to in 1999 following the tumult that
resulted from the annulled 1993 presidential election, which Moshood Abiola, a
southerner was acclaimed to have won. Through ingenious political engineering
by the Nigerian power elite, a power-sharing arrangement was devised which rotates
central power between the north and south. After
eight years in the south via Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidency (1999-2007), power
had returned to the north in May 2007 via the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s presidency
and was supposed to remain there for another eight years. Despite the
constitutional provision that guarantees his succession by his deputy, Goodluck
Jonathan, a southerner, the north was sour for having ‘lost’ power again to the
south by virtue of Yar’Adua’s death in May 2010 barely three years into office.
The sense of loss, which ensued from Yar’Adua’s death manifested in the tension
in which Nigeria was soaked in the pre-2011 general elections period.
Conclusion
This study has examined various
theories attempting to explain the driving forces behind the Boko Haram
phenomenon. Our position is that each of the perspectives offers some degree of
insight into the problem, as well as the general patterns of political tension
and social violence in Nigeria, which Boko Haram merely epitomizes.
In any case, it is clear
that Boko Haram has metamorphosed from a strictly religious movement to one
espousing a political agenda. While acknowledging the difficulties in getting
to the root cause of the problem, the government must at least address the
issues related to Jonathan’s decision to contest the 2011 presidential
elections against the power rotation principle designed by his political party,
the PDP, and his speculated 2015 presidential ambition. Irrespective of the
constitutional provisions on individual political rights and aspirations,
solemn attention needs be paid to professor Ekeh’s postulate that, “The
historical condition in which the Nigerian state emerged has precluded its
integration into a composite society” (1989:8). Any efforts at effecting
enduring stability in Nigeria, therefore, must recognize her complex plurality,
respect the sensitivity of the component parts, and refrain from acts of
political impunity.
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